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abstract: It is intuitive to think that understanding, at least in exemplary cas-
es, solves problems. This has motivated a general view concerning the nature of 
understanding and its relation to problem-solving. In this text, I examine four 
reasons offered in favor of thinking that understanding solves problems. I argue 
that the reasons given are not conclusive. It is telling that all these reasons can be 
questioned because they explore different facets of understanding, phenomenal and 
epistemic alike, suggesting that no aspect essential to understanding necessarily 
involves problem-solving. I conclude by exploring the larger significance this fact 
might have for the nature of understanding.
key words: Understanding, problem-solving, insights, puzzlement, creativity, 
expertise.
Introduction
What is understanding? We use the word in many different ways. Here 
are a few generalities to target the meaning I will explore. We might 
say someone understands how to dance when they can dance well. We 
understand what our interlocutors say when we know what they mean. 
We understand the pain a friend is going through when we can empat-
hize with them. And we understand what we see when we can properly 
conceptualize the visual scene. In what follows, I put such uses aside and 
focus on explanatory understanding. This is the kind of understanding 
we get when we grasp an explanation of the phenomenon understood 
– or when we have all the needed pieces of information and are able to 
readily produce such an explanation.
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Explanatory understanding, in turn, has been conceived in several 
ways. For instance, having an overall grasp of Euclidean geometry is 
one way to possess (objectual) understanding. I can understand that a 
murder has been committed without knowing why. I can understand 
and explain why birds chirp in the evening, or I can understand and 
explain how they manage to emit the sounds they do. All these seem to 
be distinct endeavors.
Nevertheless, it does not seem that the word “understanding” is 
merely equivocal across such uses, with nothing genuinely cognitive or 
epistemic in common. On the contrary, we often attribute understand-
ing (of the explanatory or intellectual sort) without specifying which 
kind it is: understanding-of, understanding-that, understanding-how, 
or understanding-why. And we often take ourselves to be correct in 
making these attributions.
Our attributive practices call for explanation in terms of some unified 
conception of explanatory understanding. It is this unified phenome-
non that I have in view. For instance, having an overall objectual grasp 
of Euclidean geometry often enables me to give explanations of why 
problems can be solved some way but not some other way, to know that 
some theorems apply and others not, and to know how to best construct 
a figure so that the solution to a problem becomes more apparent.
Does understanding, conceived this way, have any deep ties to prob-
lem-solving? We are often – but not always – puzzled. When we are 
puzzled for good reason, there is a problem we are tackling that we are 
puzzled about. When we understand something, we sometimes – perhaps 
always – solve just such a problem.
Here is an example. With a modicum of knowledge, we all under-
stand why the sun rises every morning. This example is not as involved 
as it might seem. Fully understanding why the sun rises every morning 
might involve knowing a lot of astronomy and a little bit of its history. 
But, at a minimal level, knowing why the sun rises involves knowing 
only some principled facts about circular motion with a light source at a 
distance, plus some facts about how we use words – e.g., that the Earth 
rotates in 24 hours, alternating between night on the side of the Earth 
opposite to the Sun and day on the side of the Earth facing the Sun. 
Knowing this much is enough for a minimal understanding of why the 
sun rises every day. Most people are likely to have at least this minimal 
understanding.
Even children can understand why the sun rises every day. How 
do they do it? Suppose you take your child to the carousel (the biggest 
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one in the park). As the carousel starts spinning, the child always looks 
at you and waives when he can see you. But because the carousel is big, 
there will be seconds when the child won’t be able to see you. When 
they come back around to the other side after each round, there will be 
a moment when they can see you again. That is very much like the sun 
rising; the key to the analogy is this. You are the Sun, the distant light 
source. The carousel is the Earth, which rotates. The child is the man 
waiting for dawn to spot the first ray of light. When the child cannot see 
you and waive, that is the analogue of night. When the child can see you 
and waive, that is the analogue of day. When the child stops being able 
to see you (because of the carousel walls), that is like dusk. And when 
the child first sees you again after a round, that is like dawn. The clearer 
view the child gets of you corresponds with the sun rising in the sky. 
And the more difficult view the child gets of you as the carousel spins 
corresponds with the sun slowly dipping beneath the horizon.
Examples like this one motivate a general view concerning the 
nature of understanding: in understanding, we solve problems. If this 
claim were true, that would vindicate an epistemology of inquiry for 
understanding according to which crucial to the states of mind that we 
characterize as understanding is the fact that they occur as part of an 
ongoing epistemic project in which the thinker is engaged. If it were true 
that understanding solves problems, we would also have the beginnings 
of an attempt at unifying different meanings of “understanding” becau-
se explanatory understanding could essentially only occur as part of a 
practical endeavor – the activity of solving problems.
Is it true that understanding solves problems?1 I will examine four ar-
guments offered in favor of thinking that understanding solves problems, 
and I will argue that each of them falls short of providing conclusive 
support for the claim in its full generality. This is significant because they 
explore different facets of understanding – phenomenal (experiences of 
insight and puzzlement) and epistemic (creativity and skill manifestati-
on) – suggesting that no salient aspect of understanding can, by its very 
nature, be tied to problem-solving.2
1 Of course, people rather than states of mind solve problems; the question is whether we, 
by understanding, solve problems.
2 If we cannot definitively establish whether understanding solves problems, that leads 
to larger questions about how we should best characterize understanding. Does understanding 
something always consist in having true conceptions about it? Does understanding something 
require being able to endorse how we understand it in reflection? If we cannot justify answers 
to such questions in full generality (as it seems we cannot), then we face a deeper conceptual 
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1. Puzzlement and insight
Something puzzles you; it doesn’t make sense, but then it hits you in a 
flash, and you come to understand how it works. This experience seems 
familiar; many have recognized it. Here is how Neil Cooper characterizes 
understanding:
Consider the following Brentanoesque series. Perplexity – yearning for absent 
knowledge – hoping that it will be ours – the courage to attempt inquiry – the 
exhilaration of understanding at length attained. The members of this series 
show an intimate connection which leads us from a consciousness of cognitive 
need up to the enjoyment of the highest intellectual good. (Cooper 1994: 26)3
When coming to understand is a conscious experience, it is typically 
preceded by puzzlement, wondering, feeling unsure, or losing one’s 
footing. When we figure out what puzzled us, we understand how to 
solve the problem bothering us. If the episodes in which we come to 
understand something new typically have a deep connection with the 
feeling of being puzzled, perhaps that is because, in understanding, we 
solve puzzles. How should we approach this line of thought?
Plainly, we don’t need to undergo any noticeable subjective feeling 
every time we come to understand something. We often come to un-
derstand things even if we were not puzzled at the time nor had been 
puzzled by those facts before. In some cases we might feel puzzlement, 
and in others not. But if instances of conscious understanding typify or are 
paradigmatic for all instances of understanding, this worry is allayed. One 
outstanding trouble is that a phenomenological approach to understand-
ing needs to provide evidence in favor of thinking conscious experience 
is central to understanding in the needed way. Anecdotes of puzzlement 
and relief at understanding are insufficient evidence to that effect.
No matter how questions of unconscious understanding are resol-
ved, there is a deeper issue. Suppose we assumed that experiences of 
puzzlement are related to genuine problems, and experiences of under-
standing are related to genuine understanding – the ability to explain 
what is understood and to further use it in reasoning. We can only be 
warranted in making that assumption if our conscious experiences – of 
problem. This is the problem of trying to epistemically characterize mental states in full gener-
ality. Failing to do in the case of understanding raises similar concerns for other epistemically 
significant states (belief, reflection, or “hot cognition”). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer 
for probing the larger significance of the project in this text.
3 Psychologist Alison Gopnik (1998: 110) concurs, pointing to how widespread our puzzle-
ment is before we come to understand something.
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puzzlement and of coming to understand – are accurate. Why think that 
our experiences of understanding are accurate? We often have a “feeling 
of knowing” (Koriat 2000) that is mistaken or misleading. It might be 
a flaw in our epistemic character to trust our experiences in a way that 
is not commensurate to their evidential status (assessed from a third-
person perspective).
When inquiry goes well, perhaps understanding always follows 
puzzlement. But the tie could be broken. Do we always understand 
something only if inquiry starts with puzzlement? Could not figuring 
something out come out of the blue, without conscious prerequisites? 
Our minds wander, and we hit upon something that had not occurred 
to us before. “Aha!” we might think, “this is how things stand!” The bus 
and the hike are typical contexts when insights occur, moments in which 
it strikes us how things stand and how they are connected to each other 
(Nanay 2011). Puzzlement might arise on the bus or the hike trail alike, 
but it need not. Insights, and understanding, can occur serendipitously.
The thought that understanding solves problems raises the general 
issue of how understanding is conceived here. Does this include scientific, 
aesthetic, religious, and emotional understanding, or only some of them? 
Experiences of scientific insight and religious revelation might often 
feel similar (van Fraassen 1999). However, if we think that religious and 
scientific understanding share little if anything in common, it should 
follow that conscious experiences don’t reveal much of the epistemic 
purport of understanding. If so, we should not expect an epistemic success 
like solving problems to follow from having conscious experiences of 
understanding or puzzlement.
2. Creativity
For Michael Lynch, the states of mind by which we understand phe-
nomena around us – why it rained heavily yesterday, why Napoleon lost 
at Waterloo, why overstaying one’s welcome is impolite – are states that 
are identified in terms of the moments in which they were acquired – 
moments of coming to understand.
Coming to understand has a particular phenomenological appearance ... cre-
ative acts can be surprising even if they do not necessarily provoke that “aha” 
moment. … Even when coming to understand happens gradually over time it 
still feels “new” – as if you couldn’t have understood it prior to that moment. 
(Lynch 2017: 203)
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All moments of coming to understand involve “some degree of insight.” 
Insights, for Lynch, are conscious experiences typified by the psychologi-
cal novelty and surprise they elicit. It is precisely because of the novelty 
they bring that insights are creative and
[…] generative of valuable, not just psychologically novel ideas. Creative ideas 
are valuable to the person’s cognitive workspace. They move things forward on 
the conceptual field on which they are currently playing […] they contribute to 
the problems at hand. (Lynch 2017: 202)
Creativity, in turns, means that the contents of insightful experiences 
advance our epistemic situation. They solve problems on our agenda, 
provide needed explanations, or help us draw salient inferences.
Lynch’s discussion of creativity clarifies the relation between states 
of mind by which we understand and moments of coming to under-
stand that produce such states. It also identifies insights as the kind of 
experience characteristic of coming to understand something,4 and it 
begins to address the issue of how subjective and objective elements of 
understanding relate – how puzzlement expresses real puzzles, and how 
insights give rise to good solutions to those puzzles. Creativity is key 
here; our subjective insights are creative, and that means they objectively 
advance our epistemic situation.
Bracketing other worries, let us focus on how creativity is concei-
ved here. Lynch follows Boden (2004) in distinguishing psychological 
from historical creativity. When creativity is purely psychological, we 
are reinventing the wheel, although doing so might be beneficial for us. 
When creativity is historical, we produce objectively new theories and 
explanations, new technologies and artifacts, thereby solving outstanding 
problems everyone faces.
Contra Lynch’s line of thought, however, the distinction between 
psychological and historical creativity raises the question of phenomenal 
vs. epistemic all over again. If the novelty of insights is merely psycho-
logical, it is far from clear what epistemic benefit insights bring (a benefit 
we could not get, say, by deferring to expert testimony).5 On the other 
4 Contra Lynch’s identification of understanding in terms of moments of insight, notice 
that we typically have streaks of insights leading up to a new understanding of something. Con-
sider only how the understanding of combustion went from being explained by phlogiston to 
being explained by oxidation (van Fraassen 1999). No single moment of insight could typify our 
understanding of combustion. This criticism applies to the phenomenological argument as well.
5 Understanding seems to enjoy a cognitive ownership one could not likewise claim for 
knowledge gained by testimony. It is by one’s own cognitive powers that one should be able 
to grasp an explanation of the phenomenon understood (Elgin 2007). However, in reaping 
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hand, if creativity is indeed historical, we run into trouble again, as few 
cases of subjective understanding are genuinely or historically creative. 
Either way, it is hard to see how purely subjective elements in under-
standing – e.g., “Aha!” experiences – could be responsible for objective 
epistemic success in solving problems.6
The creativity and phenomenological arguments for the thought 
that understanding solves problems fail for analogous reasons – for 
not adequately capturing the relation between subjective and objective 
elements in understanding. I will next consider two different arguments 
for supporting the thought that understanding solves problems. The 
arguments to follow share something important; they focus on elements 
in understanding that can be objectively evaluated. Thus, the kind of 
objection raised so far cannot be marshaled against them. Still, I will 
argue that those arguments fail for a different reason.
3. Phases of problem-solving
Mark Newman (2012, 2017) has discussed scientific understanding under 
two headings. First, he thinks, comes comprehension. This stage roughly 
corresponds with understanding-that. In comprehension, we conceptu-
alize a phenomenon without inquiring into its causal structure.7 Second 
comes theoretical understanding, or understanding-why. Not only do 
we have appropriate conceptions of the phenomenon into which we 
inquire, but we also grasp the relevant difference-makers for it; we grasp 
the conditions in which the phenomenon might have not occurred – or 
might have occurred in a different manner than it did. This grasp gives 
us a flexible, nuanced understanding of why the phenomenon explained 
occurs. Here is the distinction:
Shallow knowledge is literal knowledge of an explanation. This may include the 
explicitly mentioned ideas in a text such as the definition of concepts, simple facts 
or properties of a concept or system, and even the major or large-scale steps in a 
knowledge by testimony, surely the credit for knowing should belong to the witness giving the 
testimony, not to us as listeners, however much we might exercise open-mindedness or empathetic 
listening while we gain such knowledge.
6 Child (2017) argues that there is a difference between saying the content of insights is 
creative and saying that the experience of insight itself is necessary for grasping that intuited 
content. It may be that we have reliable experiences of insight, but what is intuited in them would 
have occurred to us even if it lacked the striking, surprising conscious character it assumed. This is 
another way of challenging Lynch’s idea that conscious insights typify the resulting understanding.
7 We might, at the level of rote memorization, know that a given effect typically has a 
given cause.
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procedure. One can develop shallow knowledge with mere referential inference on 
the information given. This level of comprehension is at the semantically atomic 
level, where concepts lack inter-theoretic integration and there is a minimum of 
coherence achieved. Deep knowledge is, however, less straightforwardly defined. 
We know that it requires activating cognitive processes that enable the learner 
to build one form or another of cognitive representation of the situation being 
explained. Deep knowledge is achieved by the encoding into memory of detailed 
coherent explanations. This knowledge once achieved permits the subject to 
perform further inferences, solve problems, make decisions, make predictions, 
etc. (Newman 2012: 8)
For Newman, deep knowledge of an explanation follows from theoretical 
understanding; we can understand a phenomenon only if we understand 
the theory by which we explain it. He argues that theoretical understand-
ing solves problems. We understand a theory, Newman thinks, only if 
we are able to put it to use in problem-solving: “[…] we take exams to 
show we have not only learned a theory by memorizing it – a shallow 
sort of knowing it – but also that we understand the theory; we know 
how to use it” (Newman 2017: 179).
It is not analytic that understanding a theory involves using it to 
solve problems. Rather, for Newman, the phases of theoretical under-
standing correspond to phases of problem-solving, so understanding is 
a species of problem-solving:
[T]he parallel between their conceptual expertise model and our model of 
understanding of theory is obvious, and compelling. So in summary, according 
to van Lehn and van de Sande, what differentiates physics experts from novices 
is a complex group of cognitive abilities that stretch from advanced descriptive 
knowledge and rules for principle selection, to confluences based on qualitative 
interpretations of those principles and strategic planning on arriving at the 
correct solution. Let’s call these the “understanding facts” (they seem to track 
nicely with our intuitions about theoretical understanding, and are derived from 
empirical studies):
(1) description phase knowledge; 
(2) principle applicability knowledge; 
(3) principle confluences; 
(4) planning confluences.
According to [the inferential model of understanding], these same stages are 
constitutive of expressing theoretical understanding. And if we are willing to 
accept that the two are co-extensive, we might quite happily endorse their unity. 
(Newman 2017: 591)
Here are two objections to Newman’s line of thought. The relationship 
between understanding and problem-solving seems tenuous at best. 
Newman focuses on the cognitive science of solving problems in ele-
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mentary physics. If, by contrast, one considers understandings of histor­
ical events, conjectures made about physics problems no longer apply. 
Techniques of measurement cease to apply when we deal with events 
that are – in the relevant sense – one of a kind. Due to singular causa-
tion, the counterfactual robustness typical of natural processes fails to 
apply. Historical events involve, first and foremost, intentions of the 
social actors at play.
For instance, take common partial explanations of why the stock 
market crashed in 1929. There is a background theory – Keynes’ boom 
and bust view – that seeks to make sense of the market. Other con-
siderations made by Keynes partly help to explain the event, such as 
renouncing the gold standard. These two explanations are related to 
some extent; because the gold standard was given up, differences between 
market value and real value could grow unhinged, and entrepreneurs are 
forced to become, to an increasing extent, speculators on the market. It 
is here that expectations about stocks – expectations about how buyers’ 
expectations develop – become crucial, and “animal spirits” might trigger 
either boom or bust – or, typically, both in a cycle. All this has little if 
anything in common with how to solve physics problems.
Suppose, however, that we examine understanding in the formal and 
natural sciences alone. It follows from Newman’s view that, if one finds 
oneself unable to solve problems one is faced with – especially when 
those problems are difficult, conceptual, or explanatory – then one does 
not truly understand. This is regardless of whether one has the right states 
of mind if one is unable to mobilize them in problem-solving activity. 
This consequence is, I think, implausible as long as it does not come as 
part of a stipulation concerning what counts as understanding.
4. Expertise
Are understanders experts at solving problems that involve what they 
understand? Catherine Elgin thinks so:
[S]omeone who understands geometry can reason geometrically about new 
problems, apply geometrical insights in different areas, assess the limits of geo-
metrical reasoning for the task at hand, and so forth. Understanding something 
like the Athenian victory is not exactly like understanding geometry, since the 
applications and extensions are more tentative, the range to which insights can 
reasonably be applied is more restricted, the evidence for a successful application 
is empirical (and may be hard to come by), and so on. But in both cases under-
standing involves an adeptness in using the information one has, not merely an 
appreciation that things are so. Evidently, in addition to grasping connections, 
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an understander needs an ability to use the information at his disposal. (Elgin 
2007: 35)
It is not that it simply so happens that understanding geometry involves 
solving geometry problems. Rather, one’s understanding is commensurate 
to one’s expertise (Newman 2017: 579). And one’s expertise is assessed 
by one’s capacity to solve non-trivial problems – so-called conceptual 
problems (Laudan 1977). In other words, one has the ability to anticipate 
qualitative solutions to problems that require detailed calculations and 
to qualitatively anticipate approximations of the results correctly. Here 
is an example:
Consider the way Ludwig Boltzmann introduced the kinetic theory in his Lec­
tures on Gas Theory. [He] devotes the introductory section to a purely qualitative 
analysis that leads to the conclusion that a gas can be pictured as a collection 
of freely moving molecules in a container. In a quite straightforward way, this 
molecular-kinetic picture can give us a qualitative feeling for the behaviour of 
macroscopic properties of gases. First of all, heat can be identified with molecu-
lar motion and it follows that an increase of temperature corresponds with an 
increase of the (average) kinetic energy of the gas molecules... Moreover, the 
picture immediately gives us a qualitative explanation of the fact that a gas exerts 
pressure on the walls of its container. If a gas molecule collides with a wall of the 
container, it gives it a little push. The total effect of the pushing of the molecules 
produces the pressure. In more formal terms: molecules exert forces on the wall 
and the total force of all molecules on a unit area equals the macroscopic pres-
sure. (de Regt and Dieks 2005: 152)
One advantage of invoking expertise in support of the thought that 
understanding solves problems is that, according to it, there is not a 
disconnect between one’s grasp of a theory and which theoretical virtues 
that theory enjoys. As de Regt explains:
In this pragmatic dimension two elements play a crucial role: whether scientists 
are able to use a theory for explaining a phenomenon depends both on their 
skills and on the virtues of the theory. More precisely, it depends on whether the 
right combination of scientists’ skills and theoretical virtues is realized. Particular 
virtues of theories, e.g., visualizability or simplicity, may be valued by scientists 
because they facilitate the use of the theory in constructing models and pre-
dicting or explaining phenomena; in this sense they are pragmatic virtues. But 
not all scientists value the same qualities: their preferences are related to their 
skills, acquired by training and experience, and to other contextual factors such 
as their background knowledge, metaphysical commitments, and the properties 
of already entrenched theories. (de Regt 2004: 103)
Here are two implausible consequences of this view. First notice 
that problem-solving is taken to be a reliable indicator of the skills un-
derstanders supposedly enjoy. Absent problem-solving, one would still 
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count as understanding; only the third-person evidence for attributing 
understanding would be missing.
Secondly, this account ties skill-possession with the ability to solve 
conceptual problems.8 This might hold even without the manifestation of 
skill being required in solving the problems one has the ability to solve. 
From the fact that understanding is commensurate to one’s expertise, it 
does not follow that moments of coming to understand – or of exercising 
a previously held understanding – need to solve concrete problems the 
thinker is facing there and then.
Conclusion
Often, we come to understand something by dispelling an initial sense of 
puzzlement. Granted, that does not always happen, but such subjective 
experiences raise a deeper question about the nature of understanding: do 
understanding and problem-solving relate in any deep metaphysical way? 
Contra widespread intuitions, I have argued that they do not. We cannot 
avail ourselves of a few successful cases in which scores of problems get 
solved following deep moments of understanding. There is a silent crowd 
of cases in which we understand without solving any palpable problem. 
We need to do justice to shiny and shadowy cases alike, so no general 
claim covering all can be properly supported.
It is natural to ask what the take-home lesson is from noting that 
problem-solving is not a necessary condition for understanding even if 
we considered several senses for “understanding” and “problem-solving” 
alike. The line of thought supported in the text suggests, by analogy, 
that such failures might occur on a larger scale. Consider thinking that 
reflective endorsement of how we conceive of things might be necessary 
for duly understanding them. Or consider thinking that it might be 
necessary, in order to properly understand something, that our under-
standing of it originates in the manifestation of intellectual virtues or 
cognitive skills. Assessing such claims will obviously depend on what we 
mean by “understanding,” “reflective endorsement,” “intellectual virtues,” 
and “cognitive skills.” It might also depend on which field of inquiry the 
necessary relationship envisaged is supposed to be relative to.
As in the case of understanding and problem-solving, it might 
be that such metaphysical claims of necessity cannot be adequately 
supported for the same general reasons highlighted here: differences in 
8 Set aside the thorny issue of trying to identify which problems get to count as conceptual.
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the meanings of key words, and paying too much attention to famous 
cases at the expense of everyday ones (or the other way around). This 
article has worked as an example of how we might ascertain claims of 
metaphysically necessary conditions when it comes to genuinely un-
derstanding something. And the example suggests that we might best 
assess such claims semantically and evidentially rather than jumping to 
metaphysical conclusions.
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